**
Stephen Read
** - Truthmakers and the Disjunction Thesis

The correspondence theory of truth has experienced something of a
revival recently in the form of the Truthmaker Axiom: whatever is
true, something makes it true. We consider various postulates which
have been proposed to characterize truthmaking, in particular, the
Disjunction Thesis (**DT**), that whatever makes a disjunction true
must make one or other disjunct true. In conjunction with certain
other assumptions, **DT** leads to triviality. We show that there
are elaborations of truthmaking on which **DT** holds (which must
therefore take steps to avoid the triviality); but that there are more
plausible accounts of truthmaking on which **DT** fails.

*Reference*: G. Restall, `Truthmakers, entailment and necessity',
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74 (1996) pp.\ 331-40.